Background to

A Psychologial Profile of Adolph Hitler by Walter
C Langer

Dr S D Stein

The United States Office of Strategic Services was established in 1942,
being an offshoot of an agency formed in 1941, known as the Coordinator of
Information, at the head of which was Colonel William J Donovan.  Its
task was to pool information gathered by all of the intelligence services
and to coordinate and organise psychological warfare in the event of the
United States entering the war.  Since 1941 Donovan had been in touch
with the author of this study, Walter C Langer, who was a psychoanalyst.
Donovan, now promoted to General, headed the OSS when it was
established in 1942.   Although it was no longer responsible for
issues concerning overt psychological warfare, Donovan suggested to Langer
in the spring of 1943 that some form of comprehensive evaluation, from a
psychological and psychoanalytical perspective of Adolf Hitler, and his
hold on the German population, would be valuable:

"What we need is a realistic appraisal of the German situation.
If Hitler is running the show, what kind of a person is he?  What
are his ambitions?  How does he appear to the German people?
What is he like with his associates?  What is his background?
And most of all, we want to know as much as possible about his
psychological make-up-the things that make him tick.  In addition,
we ought to know what he might do if things begin to go against
him.  Do you suppose you could come up with something along these
lines?  ...  Hire what help you need and get
it done as soon as possible.  Keep it brief and make it readable to
the layman." (The Mind of Adolf Hitler. Walter C
Langer. London: Secker and Warburg, 1973, pp.3-10)

Althought Donovan wanted the study to be brief and completed
expeditiously, Langer was of the opinion that the brief was "nothing short
of monumental":

Hitler, clearly, was more than the crazy paperhanger depicted in
popular prints.   Up until the age of twenty-five he manifested
many of the characteristics that we now associated with the "hippies" of
the 1960s.  He was shiftless, seemed to lack any sense of identity,
appeared to have no real sense of direction or ambition, was content to
live in filth and squalor, worked only when he had to and then
sporadically, spent most of his time in romantic dreams of being a great
artist.... Nevertheless, this apparantely insignificant
and incompetent ne'er-do-well was later able, in the course of a
relatively few years, to talk his way into the highest political
offices, hoodwink the epxerienced leaders of the major powers, turn
millions of highly civilized people into barbarians, order the
extermination of a large segment of the population, build and control
the mghtiest war machine ever known, and plunge the world into history's
most devastating war.  How could one, in a short period of time,
hope to unravel the psychological mysteries underlying such a
transformation? (ibid, pp.10-11)

In the course of carrying out the research Langer and field researchers
interviewed individuals in the United States and Canada who had had some
contact with Hitler, as well as scouring printed sources.  They
accumulated more than eleven thousand pages of excerpted quotations and
condensations that appeared to be relevant.  These all appear in
The Hitler Source Book, which was appended to the study.
The numbers that appear in brackets in the text of the study files
refer to the page numbers where the original material can be found.

The raw material that was the basis for Part V,
Hitler-Psychological Analysis and Reconstruction, was
reviewed by three psychoanalysts, who "were chosen for this difficult task
because psychoanalysis, alone, had devised a technique for exploring the
deeper regions of the mind and exposing the importance of early
experiences and unconscious components as determinants of personality
development." (ibid, p.15)   Langer acknowledges that arriving at
conclusions based on the analysis of interview materials, rather than
first-hand primary material deriving from interviews with the subject, was
not entirely satisfactory.

In approaching their task they concluded that in order to sift the raw
material it was necessary, first, to "agree on the fundamental nature of
the character structure" of the subject.

A survey of the raw material, in conjunction with our knowledge of
Hitler's actions as reported in the news, was sufficient to convince us
that he was, in all probability, a neurotic psychopath.  With this
diagnosis as our starting point of orientation, we were able to evaluate
the data in terms of probability. Those fragments that could most easily
be fitted into this general clinical category were tentatively regarded
as possessing a higher degree of probability-as far as reliability and
relevance were concerned-than those which seemed alien to the clinical
picture. (ibid, p.17)

The pressures of war meant that the gestation of the study was
considerably less than the primary author had originally intended, it
being completed in eight months.  It was designated
Secret and few copies were apparently produced.  It
is not known what influence, if any, it had on key decision makers.
As Langer concludes:

I cannot honestly believe that it did.  I am afraid that it came
to late.   The die had been cast, and the tides of war were
gradually turning in our favour.   The final outcome would be
determined, not at the negotiating table, but on the battlefield.
...  The goal we hoped to achieve was the
presentation of an unbiased and professional psychological appraisal of
Hitler-the man and his relationship to the German people-which might
serve as a common basis for decisions in the future.(ibid,
p.22)

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Document compiled by Dr S D Stein
Last update
12/10/98
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©S D
Stein
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